The relevant part is the first three lines that show that something is being closed and there is an intentional crash because there is an error closing that handle.

These stacks point to a form of corruption in the past, which is only detected when the invalid handle is being closed. Like most forms of corruption, it is not safe to continue execution at this point, but at the time of the crash there is not enough information to know when (and where) the corruption was introduced.

I am seeing Chrome hangs with stacks like this one:

[ntdll.dll + 0x00040da8 ] ZwWaitForSingleObject

[KERNELBASE.dll + 0x00001128 ] WaitForSingleObjectEx

[KERNELBASE.dll + 0x000010b3 ] WaitForSingleObject

[platform_thread_win.cc:222 ] base::PlatformThread::Join()

[thread.cc:135 ] base::Thread::Stop()

[..._process_sub_thread.cc:26 ] content::BrowserProcessSubThread::~BrowserProcessSubThread()

[chrome.dll + 0x0043dcb8 ] content::BrowserProcessSubThread::`scalar deleting destructor'()

[browser_main_loop.cc:829 ] content::BrowserMainLoop::ShutdownThreadsAndCleanUp()

[browser_main_runner.cc:146 ] content::BrowserMainRunnerImpl::Shutdown()

[browser_main.cc:28 ] content::BrowserMain()

This is another manifestation of the same underlying issue: once a handle is corrupt, using it can do anything. If the OS detects that the handle is invalid, the operation generally fails right away. However, if the handle now points to something else, operations may appear to work but do something generally unexpected. The code in this example is simply waiting on the wrong object, so most likely it will never be signaled.

What to do about it

We have better detection baked into the 32-bit builds of Dev and Canary builds of Chrome. In that case, the crash stack will hopefully morph into something that points to the code at fault.

For users:

Consider installing a Canary or Dev Channel Build (Windows only. See this for information about what a channel is and what to do before installing a new one).
Search your system for malware, and try removing software that interacts directly with Chrome by injecting DLLs. In the past we have seen correlation between 3rd party software loaded into Chrome and problems with invalid handles. You can get a list of all DLLs loaded into the browser by navigating to about:conflicts (note that most likely there are no detected conflicts even if a DLL is causing trouble).

For bug triage:

Close bugs that are reported on the Stable or Beta builds, as there is very little to do. Feel free to point to this page.
If the report comes directly from the stability result of a given version (top x on the crash server), search for a similar report and merge (it may be closed as WontFix). Avoid merging into a user-reported bug (there is a similar report somewhere for something that is internal
The ScopedHandle verifier is far from perfect, so even with a 32-bit build canary build it is bound to generate dumps that follow the same pattern of dumps from Stable. Ignore those reports.

For developers:

A Canary build will generate a properly bucketed stack dump like this:

[scoped_handle.cc:145 ] base::win::OnHandleBeingClosed()

[close_handle_hook_win.cc:27 ] `anonymous namespace'::CloseHandleHook()

[shared_memory_win.cc:75 ] base::SharedMemory::~SharedMemory()

[resource_buffer.cc:42 ] content::ResourceBuffer::~ResourceBuffer()

[ref_counted.h:192 ] base::RefCountedThreadSafe<>::DeleteInternal()

[async_resource_handler.cc:99 ] content::AsyncResourceHandler::~AsyncResourceHandler()

[chrome.dll + 0x003af3ae ] content::AsyncResourceHandler::`scalar deleting destructor'()

[...ed_resource_handler.cc:19 ] content::LayeredResourceHandler::~LayeredResourceHandler()

[chrome.dll + 0x003aebc7 ] content::BufferedResourceHandler::`scalar deleting destructor'()

[...ed_resource_handler.cc:19 ] content::LayeredResourceHandler::~LayeredResourceHandler()

[chrome.dll + 0x003ae5f8 ] content::ThrottlingResourceHandler::`scalar deleting destructor'()

[resource_loader.cc:104 ] content::ResourceLoader::~ResourceLoader()

It points to ~SharedMemory as the source of corruption. This means that said code is either double closing a handle somehow (most of the time it is far from obvious how that happens), or it is not really doing anything wrong but it is being blamed anyway. In any case, this code should not be doing manual handle management so it should be refactored to use ScopedHandle instead.

If there is a bug, it most likely will go away with the refactor. If there was no bug, ScopedHandle verifier will stop blaming this code, and the overall reliability of the verifier will go up.

So the take away is... refactor the code to remove manual handle management. This also means to modify interfaces to remove passing raw handles around and instead pass a ScopedHandle (or something that encapsulates the handle using a ScopedHandle internally). There's plenty of code to choose from!. See bugs 322664, 416721 or 417532 for some examples.
Search the crash server for stacks containing OnHandleBeingClosed to get a summary of issues currently detected as problematic.